An Extradited Defendant’s Ability to Challenge Sentencing: A glimpse into an Unpolished Piece of the Treaty Power by Connelly, Candra
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 3 Article 5 
March 2019 
An Extradited Defendant’s Ability to Challenge Sentencing: A 
glimpse into an Unpolished Piece of the Treaty Power 
Candra Connelly 
connelcd@mail.uc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Candra Connelly, An Extradited Defendant’s Ability to Challenge Sentencing: A glimpse into an Unpolished 
Piece of the Treaty Power, 87 U. Cin. L. Rev. 787 (2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and 
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact 
ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
787 
AN EXTRADITED DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO CHALLENGE 
SENTENCING: A GLIMPSE INTO AN UNPOLISHED PIECE OF 
THE TREATY POWER 
Candra Connelly 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A photo taken on January 19, 2017 depicts two DEA agents escorting 
Joaquïn Guzmán Loera off of plane in Long Island, New York.1 The 
famous drug king, most commonly known as “El Chapo,” had lost his 
appeal to block extradition and was being transferred from Mexico to 
the United States to stand trial for money laundering and running a 
continuous criminal enterprise.2 Article IV, Section 2 of the United 
States Constitution is the source behind modern-day extradition policy.3 
While the general framework for extradition can be found throughout 
United States statutory law, specific extradition policies between 
jurisdictions are backed by reciprocal agreements or treaties between 
nations.4 The basis behind El Chapo’s extradition was a treaty between 
the United States and Mexico that was entered into force on December 
11, 1861.5 
The broad language and complex history behind extradition policy is 
the root of an ongoing debate regarding whether a defendant who has 
been extradited to the United States has proper standing to attack his 
sentence under a treaty’s “specialty” provision. According to this 
provision, a defendant may only be punished for crimes for which he 
was extradited.6 In other words, after a defendant has been extradited to 
 
 1. Azam Ahmned, El Chapo, Mexican Drug Kingpin, Is Extradited to the U.S., N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/world/el-chapo-extradited-mexico.html.  
 2. El Chapo also faced prosecution for manufacturing and distributing a broad range of drugs 
and using firearms. See id.  
 3. U.S. Const. art. IV, §2. “A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, 
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority 
of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the 
Crime.” See id. The statutory basis for extradition is found in Title 18, Section 3182 of the United States 
Code. Cornell Law School, Extradition, LEGAL INFO. INSTIT., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/extradition (last visited Apr. 5, 2018). 
 4. Id. Policies and processes of extradition within the United States exist as well. However, 
those policies and processes are beyond the purview of this paper.  
 5. Extradition Treaty with Mexico; By the President of the United States of America. A 
Proclamation Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, for the 
Extradition of Criminals, N.Y. TIMES: ARCHIVES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1862/06/29/archives/extradition-treaty-with-mexico-by-the-president-of-the-
united.html.  
 6. Doctrine of Specialty Law and Legal Definition, USLegal, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/doctrine-of-specialty. 
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the United States, he may only stand trial for the crimes stated in the 
extradition request. The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Fontana found 
that a defendant possesses the requisite standing to challenge any issues 
that may present themselves during sentencing under the specialty 
provision.7 The court found that although a defendant generally 
possesses the appropriate standing, this particular defendant did not.8 
Disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the defense applied to the Supreme 
Court for writ of certiorari. In November 2017 the Supreme Court 
declined the request.9 The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Fontana is at odds 
with the Third Circuit’s decision in United States ex rel. Saroop v. 
Garcia.10 where the court held that a habeas corpus11 petitioner lacked 
standing to invoke rules of specialty to challenge a violation of an 
extradition treaty existing between the United States and Trinidad and 
Tobago.12  
This article seeks to reconcile whether a defendant possesses standing 
to challenge sentencing through an extradition treaty’s specialty 
provision. The answer to this question cannot be reached without a look 
into whether a foreign citizen should be allowed to proceed with claims 
involving the violation of an international treaty generally. Therefore, 
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the treaty power, 
discusses the history of extradition policy as a general matter, and 
provides a more centralized look into particular extradition treaties 
between the United States and other countries through case law. To aid 
in the analysis of specific treaties, United States v. Fontana and United 
States ex. rel. Saroop v. Garcia will be delved into. Part III analyzes 
both sides of the argument of whether a foreign individual should have 
the power to challenge a violation of a treaty. This analysis more 
specifically involves an answer to whether a foreign defendant possesses 
standing to attack his sentencing under the specialty provision, 
ultimately concluding that he does. Part IV concludes with a brief glance 
into what the treaty power and a foreign defendant’s rights may look 
like going forward under the specialty provision.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution vests the power 
 
 7. 869 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 8. Id. at 472. 
 9. 138 S. Ct. 490 (Mem).   
 10. 109 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 11. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2255. 
 12. 109 F.3d at 168. 
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to make treaties in the President.13 This enumerated power is not 
absolute; the Senate serves as the regulating body to the treaty power by 
giving “the president . . . advice and counsel, [serving as a] check [on] 
presidential power, and [working to] safeguard the sovereignty of the 
states by giving each state an equal vote in the treaty making process.”14 
While the Senate serves to police the treaty power, it does not frequently 
reject a treaty.15 Section (A) provides a general overview of the treaty 
power. Subsection (i) looks at the difference between self-executing and 
non-self-executing treaties and discusses the important distinctions 
between the two. Subsection (ii) looks at how treaties are generally 
interpreted. Subsection (iii) provides a more direct look into extradition 
and the specialty provision. Lastly, Section (B) discusses relevant 
extradition case law to help guide the discussion as to whether a 
defendant possesses or should possess the requisite standing to 
challenge sentencing under a treaty’s specialty provision.  
A. An Overview of the Treaty Power 
“A treaty is ‘primarily a compact between independent nations.’”16 
The President, in making a treaty, is bound by three limitations: “(1) 
two-thirds vote of the Senate must approve the treaty; (2) the treaty 
cannot violate an independent constitutional bar; and (3) the treaty 
cannot disrupt our constitutional structure by giving away sovereignty 
reserved to the states.”17 The first two are widely accepted norms in 
treaty creation and implementation, but many constitutional scholars 
believe that Justice Holmes struck down the third limitation in Missouri 
v. Holland.18 In Federalist Paper Number 75, Alexander Hamilton 
stated, “the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the 
participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the 
 
 13. U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
 14. United States Senate, Treaties, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Ted Cruz, Limits on the Treaty Power, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 93 (2014) (quoting Edye v. 
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)). 
 17. Id. at 105. 
 18. Id. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1920). In delivering his Missouri v. 
Holland opinion, Justice Holmes stated that “if a treaty is valid, ‘there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the statute [implementing it] under Article 1, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to 
execute the powers of the Government.” Many scholars believe that it is this iteration that struck down 
the third requirement that a “treaty cannot disrupt our constitutional structure by way of giving 
sovereignty reserved to the states.” Under Justice Holmes rationale, Congress has the authority via the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to pass any legislation it sees fit to implement a treaty, a contention that 
many scholars disagree with, arguing that Justice Holmes got it wrong. Cruz, supra note 16, at 118. See 
also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (2005). 
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office of making them.”19 For the Senate to approve a resolution of 
ratification, the partisan divide must be overcome.20 This divide is 
frequently overcome when a treaty is being contemplated, as evidenced 
by a two hundred year period where the Senate approved more than 
1,500 treaties and rejected only 21. The majority of the rejected treaties 
were denied approval more than once,21 often as a result of the leaders 
of the Senate finding that the specific treaty lacked the requisite support 
to pass muster.22 While only 21 treaties were actually rejected by the 
Senate, 85 were eventually withdrawn because the Senate refused to act 
on them for an extended period of time.23  
Treaties are not the sole way for the United States to interact with 
other countries. The alternative to a treaty is an executive agreement, the 
existence of which became more popular after World War II.24 The 
Senate attributes the increase of executive agreements to an increase in 
the “sheer volume of business conducted between the United States and 
other countries, coupled with the already heavy workload of the 
Senate.”25 The President has authority to enter executive agreements 
regarding foreign aid, agriculture, and trade.26 While executive 
agreements are a relevant part of international law, treaties have been, 
and will continue to be, the main source of extradition policy between 
nations.27 
1. Types of Treaties and Treaty Termination 
There are two types of treaties: self-executing and non-self-
executing.28 Self-executing treaties have an immediate binding effect on 
domestic law at the time of enactment.29 Non-self-executing treaties do 
not become binding domestically without some sort of legislation 
enacted to make them so.30 In other words, non-self-executing treaties 
“comprise international commitments, but they are not domestic law 
unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty 
 
 19. United States Senate, supra note 14. 
 20. Id. The 2/3 majority represents the bipartisan divide being overcome. 
 21. The rejected treaties included the Treaty of Versailles. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. In 1952, the United States only signed 14 treaties, after signing 291 executive agreements. Id. 
 25. An executive agreement has essentially the same function as a treaty, but it does not require a 
two-thirds majority. See id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Cruz, supra note 16.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 108. 
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itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on 
such terms.”31 Therefore, a non-self-executing treaty is simply the 
United States making a promise to another country that something will 
later be enacted into law; the promise itself does not constitute an 
obligation on United States citizens, without the actual enactment of 
accompanying legislation.32 The President is aware that such promises 
to other nations are permissible, but that they may not necessarily ever 
become domestic law, and thus binding on citizens, until there has been 
explicit Congressional authority.33 Extradition treaties, however, are 
self-executory—meaning that no domestic legislation must be forced for 
extradition to be permissible.34  
While the power to create a treaty is granted by the Constitution, the 
Constitution is silent when it comes to a treaty’s termination. President 
Carter terminated two treaties during his tenure as President35 and only 
on a single instance has Congress terminated a treaty by joint 
resolution.36 A peaceful process of terminating treaties has yet to be 
determined.37 
2. Treaty Interpretation  
To determine how a treaty shall be interpreted, it must first be 
determined whether or not the treaty is self-executing. As stated above, 
a treaty has no direct impact on, nor does it impose any duty on, a 
United States citizen if the treaty is non-self-executing. However, if a 
treaty is self-executing or when legislation is enacted to make it so,38 the 
starting point to treaty interpretation is with the text of the treaty.39 
Beyond the text, a treaty should be interpreted by usage of the 
negotiation and drafting history, as well as “the post-ratification 
understanding” of all signatory nations.40 The topic of treaty 
interpretation is highly unlikely to arise when a treaty is not being 
challenged. Since many international treaties, like extradition treaties, 
 
 31. Igartua-de la Rose v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005).  
 32. Cruz, supra note 16, at 108. 
 33. This explicit congressional authority is in the form of enacted legislation. Id. 
 34. International Extradition, USLegal, https://extradition.uslegal.com/international-extradition/.  
 35. President Carter terminated a U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan and replaced three previous 
treaties with Panama with a new one regarding the Panama Canal. United States Senate, supra note 14. 
 36. Congress terminated a mutual defense treaty with France and in doing so dubbed the United 
States “free and exonerated.” The termination of this treaty almost sent the US to war, later ultimately 
resulting in “authorized hostilities against France.” Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. A non-self- executing treaty must have legislation in place to force citizens to abide by it. If 
there is no legislation in place for a non-self-executing treaty than we do not reach the text of the treaty. 
 39. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008). 
 40. Id. at 507 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)). 
5
Connelly: Individual Rights Under the Specialty Provision
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
792 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
are self-executing, if a signatory nation disagrees with the terms, the 
treaty will not go into effect.41 Therefore, a treaties terms are only likely 
to be in dispute when an issue arises that a signatory party perceives is 
unfair or against their original intent.42 Furthermore, the majority of 
today’s jurisprudence suggests that only signatory nations can challenge 
treaty provisions. This suggests that for the signatory nation to challenge 
a provision on behalf of an individual, the nation must be made aware 
that a violation may have occurred, otherwise the alleged violation may 
likely go unnoticed.43 
The Supreme Court recognized in Sumitomo Shoji Am v. Avagliano44 
that the signatory nation’s interpretation and intent will ultimately be the 
source of a treaty’s meaning.45 The Supreme Court’s dicta reveals this in 
Medellin v. Texas: “[w]hen the parties to a treaty both agree as to the 
meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows from the 
clear treaty language, we must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary 
evidence, defer to that interpretation.”46 
Since treaties are agreements between nations, individual citizens of 
signatory countries generally cannot challenge treaty interpretations in 
the absence of an express provision within the treaty, unless the action is 
brought by the signatory nation on behalf of the citizen.47 The Third 
Circuit in United States ex rel. Saroop stated: “[i]t is well established 
that individuals have no standing to challenge violation of international 
treaties in the absence of a protest by the sovereigns involved.”48 This 
piece of 1997 dicta is currently at the center of a current circuit split 
involving the Sixth Circuit, where the court found this United States ex 
rel. Saroop dicta to be incorrect in Fontana.49  
3. Introduction to Extradition and the Specialty Provision 
Chapter 18 of the United States Code enunciates the extradition 
power and its policy.50 A concise definition of what constitutes 
 
 41. It is generally accepted that treaties will not be entered into until all signatory nations agree 
to the terms. Once the terms are agreed upon, the treaty will be signed by the nations. 
 42. This issue, as well as the issue of how signatory nations can be the only parties to dispute a 
treaty, will be addressed in the discussion section of this paper.  
 43. See generally United States ex rel. Saroop, 109 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 1997); Sosa v. Alvarez- 
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).  
 44. 457 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 185. 
 46. Id.  
 47. United States ex rel. Saroop, 109 F.3d at 167. 
 48. Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981)).  
 49. See Fontana, 869 F.3d at 464. 
 50. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3181 et. seq. 
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extradition is: “the surrender of an accused usually under the provisions 
of a treaty or statute by one sovereign (as a state or nation) to another 
that has jurisdiction to try the accused and that has demanded his or her 
return.”51 The extradition provisions apply specifically to those who 
commit crimes in foreign countries and continues in effect as long as an 
extradition treaty is in existence between the United States and the 
country in question.52 More specifically, the extradition provisions of the 
Code apply to persons, other than citizens, nationals, or permanent 
residents of the United States,53 who have committed some sort of crime 
against citizens, nationals, or permanent residents of the United States.54  
Two further requirements are that: (1) the crime committed must be in 
violation of Section 16 of Title 18 of the United States Code55 and (2) 
the offenses alleged cannot be of a political nature.56 The United States’ 
first extradition agreement was contained in the 1794 Jay Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain and only applied to murder 
and forgery.57 It was not until the mid-19th century, when travel started 
to become more prevalent, that an increased number of countries began 
entering into extradition agreements.58 Today, the United States is a 
signatory to over one hundred extradition treaties.59  
The extradition process varies depending on which country is 
involved.60 Once El Chapo was found in Mexico, judicial proceedings61 
 
 51. Merriam-Webster, Law Dictionary, Extradition, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/extradition.  
 52. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3181(a). 
 53. Extradition of United States citizens can be found in 18 U.S.C. § 3196.  
 54. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3181(b). 
 55. These crimes include crimes of violence. Id. A “crime of violence” involves “(a) an offense 
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial 
risk that physical force against a person or property of another may be used in the course of committing 
the offense.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 16. 
 56. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3181(b)(1). The exclusion of crimes that are of a political nature is referred to 
as the “Political Offense Exception.” There are two categories of political offenses, “pure political 
offenses” and “relative political offenses.” Pure political offenses consist of crimes that are aimed at the 
government, including crimes of treason and espionage; these crimes do not violate the rights of private 
individuals. Relative political offenses include crimes committed in connection with a political act or for 
a political motive. Purely political offenses are usually never extraditable because they are exempted 
through treaty language, while relative political offenses are more likely to be extraditable. Mark Dell 
Kielsgard, The Political Offense Exception: Punishing Whistleblowers Abroad, BLOG OF THE EUR. J. 
INT’L L. (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-political-offense-exception-punishing-
whistleblowers-abroad/. See also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1971).  
 57. Claire Suddath, A Brief History of Extraditions, TIME (2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1926810,00.html.  
 58. Id.  
 59. U.S. Dept. of Stat., Diplomacy in Action, Extradition Treaties, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70138.htm.  
 60. Office of International Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Extradition, The 
United States Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-oia/frequently-asked-questions-
7
Connelly: Individual Rights Under the Specialty Provision
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
794 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
began to determine whether the United States extradition request 
satisfied the requirements of the United States and Mexican extradition 
treaty, as well as Mexican law.62 After determining the satisfaction of 
those elements, an executive phrase began, where an executive member 
of the Mexican government determined whether Mexico would 
surrender El Chapo to the United States for extradition.63 Upon making 
the decision to extradite, a surrender order was issued and authorities in 
both countries coordinated transfer.64 This process can take months or 
years to complete, as it can be a costly and lengthy process to locate a 
defendant.65 Furthermore, usually during the judicial phase, there are 
multiple opportunities for the defendant to appeal.66  
Specialty provisions are frequently found within extradition treaties. 
Under a treaty’s specialty provision, the receiving country is barred 
from detaining or bringing additional charges against a defendant other 
than the ones for which he was extradited.67 The specialty provision was 
drafted with the intent to honor mutual promises of signatory nations to 
not bring additional charges on an extradited defendant, “[b]ecause the 
surrender of the defendant requires the cooperation of the surrendering 
state, preservation of the institution of extradition requires that the 
petitioning state live up to whatever promises it made to obtain 
extradition.”68 The existence of the specialty provision, as well as the 
extent to which it applies, varies between nations and tends to be more 
treaty specific or fact specific than a general, bright-line rule.69 Justice 
Miller, in United States v. Rauscher,70 provides a somewhat concise and 
focused iteration of the specialty provision’s consequence:  
 
“That right, as we understand it, is that he shall be tried only for 
the offence with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings 
and for which he was delivered up, and that if not tried for that, or 
after trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable time to leave the 
country before he is arrested upon the charge of any other crime 
 
regarding-extradition.  
 61. Judicial proceeding occur in what is referred to as the ‘judicial phase,’ the first of two phases 
that take place prior to extradition. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 68. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986).  
 69. Id. Meaning that the extent to which a specialty provision applies in different countries will 
depend on the language of the treaty itself, or it will point to a more fact or case specific analysis.  
 70. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 424 (1886).  
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committed previous to his extradition.”71 
 
While there seems to be a rational explanation for the existence of the 
treaty power and extradition generally, the main focus of the specialty 
provision appears to be one of purely policy.72 
B. Extradition Case Law 
At numerous points throughout history, courts have been asked: (1) to 
interpret the provisions of specific extradition treaties; and (2) to rule on 
the ability of an individual citizen to challenge the treaty’s power. The 
following case law explores the judiciary’s response. 
1. United States v. Rauscher: The Seminal Case73 
United States v. Rauscher, decided by the Supreme Court, is a 
seminal case in defining extradition policy and the specialty provision.74 
The defendant was indicted for murdering a ship crew member while he 
was within admiralty jurisdiction.75 He was extradited from Great 
Britain to the United States on “[a] treaty to settle and define the 
boundaries between the territories of the United States and the 
possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for the final 
suppression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up of criminals 
fugitive from justice, in certain cases.”76 The court noted that prior to 
treaties such as these, there was “no well-defined obligation on one 
country to deliver up such fugitives.”77  
The Court continued to examine numerous past cases from around the 
country, specifically noting that in the case of Commonwealth v. 
Hawes78 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky found that “extradited 
criminals cannot be tried for offenses not named in the treaty, or for 
offenses not named in the warrant of extradition.”79 After evaluating 
other case law, the Rauscher court concluded that while Rauscher’s 
extradition was originally lawful, it became unlawful at the point in 
which they prosecuted him for offenses that were not listed in the 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 407. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 409. 
 76. Id. at 410. See Foreign Treaties and International Agreements; Great Britain, 8 Stat. 576 
(Aug. 9, 1842).  
 77. Rauscher, 119 U.S.at 412.  
 78. 76 Ky. 697 (1878).  
 79. 119 U.S. at 428. 
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extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain, thus 
violating what we now know as the “doctrine of specialty.”80 
2. Challenging Overall Treaty Validity in US ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia81 
The Sixth Circuit’s United States v. Fontana decision is at odds with 
the Third Circuit’s decision in US ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia. In 
challenging the basis for extradition, the defendant petitioned for habeas 
corpus.82 The petition was denied, and the defendant appealed to the 
Third Circuit.83 On appeal, the court found that a valid extradition treaty 
existed between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago, thereby 
mooting the defendant’s habeas argument on the validity of the treaty.84 
The defendant, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was charged with 
supplying illegal drugs for a conspiracy based in St. Croix and as a 
result, profiting from their sale.85 She was later indicted in the United 
States Virgin Islands for drug trafficking and conspiracy.86 The United 
States sought the defendant’s extradition based on the treaty entered into 
between the United States and Great Britain in 1931.87  
The defendant’s petition rested upon proving the invalidity of the 
treaty that the United States claimed as the basis for extradition.88 Her 
claim centered on proving the treaty was invalid because it was never 
ratified upon Trinidad and Tobago’s independence from Great Britain.89 
The courts of Trinidad and Tobago did not find this argument 
persuasive, surrendering the defendant to the United States for transport 
to St. Croix.90 Awaiting trial, the defendant appealed to both the 
governments of Trinidad and Tobago and the United States that her 
holding was unlawful, eventually filing a motion for relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.91 The district court, following Trinidad and Tobago’s 
earlier decision, found the existence of a valid treaty and denied the 
defendant’s petition.92 
 
 80. Id. See also Charles D. Siegal, Individual Rights under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties – 
Dr. Alvarez- Machain’s Case, LOYOLA OF L.A. INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. (June 1, 1991). 
 81. 109 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 82. Id at 167. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 166. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 166. 
 87. Id. at 167. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 167. 
 92. Id. 
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On review, the Third Circuit held that even if the defendant had 
“brought suit invoking the treaty or the Rule of Specialty, she would 
lack standing.”93 The court reached this answer by examining other case 
law, all of which concluded that an individual does not possess the 
proper standing to challenge a violation of an international treaty in 
absence of protest by their home country.94 The court further stated: 
“[w]here the validity of the extradition treaty itself has been challenged, 
a petitioner like Saroop has standing.”95 By including this statement, the 
court clarified that while a defendant cannot bring suit alleging the 
violation of a treaty96 and does not have standing to invoke the rule of 
specialty, a defendant does have a viable position to claim that a treaty is 
invalid all together.97 
Here, the defendant failed to make an appropriate challenge, but it 
appears that even if she had, she would have lost.98 The Third Circuit 
ultimately found the existence of a valid extradition treaty between the 
United States and Trinidad and Tobago by looking at the intent and 
actions of the parties.99 The court further recognized that the lack of an 
express confirmation of an extradition treaty between two countries is 
not dispositive of whether a treaty exists in fact.100 
3. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Fontana101 
In United States v. Fontana, a defendant was extradited from Canada 
on twelve federal child-pornography related charges.102 He ultimately 
plead guilty to four of the twelve charges.103 At sentencing the judge 
took into account that after he was arrested, investigators discovered 
images and videos on his computer, of over fifty females, including 
 
 93. Id. at 168. 
 94. Id. See also United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1991); Matta-
Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990). This court noted that in Riviere, the 
defendant alleged that his extradition from Dominica violated the treaty and the Rule of Specialty and 
thus precluded his prosecution for offenses involving firearms. The court disagreed with the defendant 
on the ground that he lacked proper standing because the power to challenge a treaty violation and the 
Rule of Specialty rests with the signatory nation, not individuals.  
 95. Id. 
 96. If a defendant cannot bring suit alleging the violation a treaty, the defendant therefore cannot 
possess standing to challenge its terms.  
 97. US ex rel. Saroop, 109 F.3d at 168. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 171. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Fontana, 869 F.3d at 464.  
 102. Id. at 465. 
 103. Id. 
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minors, of which he had also victimized.104 None of the additional 
materials found on the defendant’s computer had been the basis for his 
extradition.105  
The defendant in this case posed as a sixteen-year-old boy on 
Omegle.com, connected with a fifteen-year-old girl in Michigan, 
convinced her to take off her clothing via webcam, while tricking her 
into thinking that his webcam was broken.106 He then recorded this and 
placed himself into multiple aspects of her life by blackmailing her into 
performing sexual acts via webcam on her friends, and ultimately 
emailed the photographs he had taken to her mother and over eighty 
members of her church.107  
On the defendant’s appeal of the district court judge’s discussion of 
the subsequently discovered crimes, the court looked at 18 U.S.C. § 
3553, Imposition of a Sentence.108 The defense argued that the 
sentencing judge wrongly considered the additional victims, in violation 
of the United States and Canada’s extradition treaty’s “specialty” 
provision which required that a defendant only be detained, tried, or 
punished for crimes which he was extradited.109  
The Sixth Circuit ultimately held that while extradited persons may 
defend their criminal prosecution as beyond the scope of their 
extradition,110 this particular defendant was not to be held accountable 
for the additional information obtained subsequent to his arrest.111 Since 
the information being brought into sentencing was directly related to the 
crimes for which he was extradited for, discussion of them was 
proper.112 The court further held that the treaty between the United 
States and Canada did not preclude taking into account activity that is 
the basis for the extradition in determining the punishment for the 
crimes on which the extradition was based, so long as such 
consideration does not affect the statutory range of punishment.113 In 
this situation, without consideration of the uncharged victims, the 
defendant’s net offense level was already above the possible maximum 
sentencing guidelines, essentially making any additional information 
 
 104. Id. at 466. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Sub-(a) of §3553 refers to factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The holding that extradited persons may defend their criminal prosecution as beyond the 
scope of their extradition is consistent with United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886) and 
consistent with rulings by the 11th Circuit, 10th Circuit, 9th Circuit, and 8th Circuit. Id. at 468. 
 111. Id. at 467. 
 112. Id. at 469. 
 113. Id. at 466. 
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obtained relating to prior victims irrelevant.114  
The Sixth Circuit noted that while a defendant may typically possess 
the requisite standing to object, that power is not absolute. The court 
stated that an individual has the opportunity to raise any objection that 
the individual’s home nation may have claimed, but the right to object 
ceases to exist when the individual’s home nation waives its objection 
rights.115 Therefore, the opportunity given to defendants to attack their 
sentencing or the addition of crimes post-extradition is a luxury that can 
easily be taken away by the home country.116 Ultimately the court found 
that there was nothing improper about the district judge including 
additional comments regarding the subsequently obtained materials at 
the defendant’s sentencing hearing.117 In reaching their conclusion, the 
majority opinion rejected numerous assertions made by the court in 
United States ex rel. Saroop118 by stating that their discussion was 
purely dictum.119 The court further claimed that the Saroop decision was 
essentially irrelevant in this case because the cases cited to in the former 
decision mainly “involved foreign government consent to limit the 
international specialty obligation, or did not involve the principle of 
specialty at all.”120 Thus giving rise to the circuit split in question. 
III. DISCUSSION 
In 1997, the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Saroop stated that a 
criminal defendant lacked the requisite standing to “invoke[e] the treaty 
or the Rule of Specialty.”121 The court noted that while a defendant may 
assert that a treaty is invalid, he may not assert that there has been a 
violation of a valid, existing treaty, absent backing by the signatory 
nation.122 This line of reasoning rested on the premise that “extradition 
agreements run between sovereigns, not individuals,” therefore when a 
country consents to the extradition of a defendant, the defendant lacks 
standing to challenge because his rights are derivative.123 More recently, 
the Sixth Circuit in Fontana disagreed, finding that a defendant does 
possess proper power to evoke the specialty provision. Section (A) 
 
 114. Id. at 467. 
 115. Id. at 469 (quoting United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995)).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 473.  
 118. The court specifically rejected the court’s statement that had the habeas petitioner brought a 
specialty claim, she would lack standing. 
 119. Fontana, 689 F.3d at 470. 
 120. Id. 
 121. United States ex rel. Saroop, 109 F.3d at 168. 
 122. Id. at 167. 
 123. Id. at 168. 
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discusses why it is inappropriate for only signatory nations to have the 
power to challenge a treaty’s validity, while section (B) advocates for 
the ability of individuals to challenge a treaty generally. Section (C) 
discusses the specialty provision specifically and concludes that a 
defendant should possess proper standing to evoke the rule of specialty 
to challenge sentencing. Lastly, section (D) discusses why the crimes 
that a defendant committed prior to his extradition, that were not the 
basis of his extradition, should be disregarded in all aspects of the 
judicial proceedings regarding the crimes that were listed in his 
extradition request. 
A. Allowing Only Signatory Nations to Challenge Treaty Validity is 
Inappropriate 
It is incorrect and unjust to state or to apply the law under the 
assumption that only signatory nations may challenge a violation of a 
treaty. The long accepted general rule is that treaties do not convey 
individual rights.124 However, while treaties do not convey these rights, 
they “may create judicially enforceable rights for individuals.”125 The 
main issue with allowing only signatory nations to challenge actual or 
potential treaty violations is that there may not be an incentive for them 
to do so. In fact, there may be an incentive for them not to do so.126 
States often have broader interests than those of individuals and 
therefore lack the more specialized and specific needs that individuals 
possess. In a situation where a country is facing political pressure to 
convict a criminal, the signatory nation may agree to extradite under 
even the most obnoxious requests. For example, if a person is a criminal 
in their home country and the home country is having difficulty 
prosecuting, they may choose to extradite to be relieved of their duty 
and in an attempt to please the public. This situation is illustrated by the 
extradition of El Chapo. Mexico, embarrassed after El Chapo tunneled 
himself out of what was considered to be the most secure prison in 
Mexico, decided it was better to hand him over to the United States, 
rather than risk his escape again, and also to avoid further straining 
relations with the United States.127 
Other potential issues also arise when only signatory nations have 
standing to challenge treaty violations. The signatory nation may be 
incentivized to not challenge a violation if they feel pressure from their 
 
 124. Siegal, supra note 80, at 781, fn. 90. 
 125. Id. at 781. 
 126. An example of when a country may have an incentive not to do so is in cases involving 
extradition of a criminal defendant. 
 127. Ahmned, supra note 1. 
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citizens or other countries. The nation may choose to comply with the 
request to avoid jeopardizing certain markets or relationships. This may 
result from a general fear that challenging requests or agreements may 
lead to adverse effects on the signatory nation in many internal and 
external aspects, including trade and governance.  
Furthermore, it is not proper to only allow signatory nations to 
challenge treaty violations when treaties themselves can be internally 
ambiguous. In this sense, it appears suspicious to allow only signatory 
nations to challenge a treaty that was supposed to have been carefully 
reviewed and signed, especially when the treaty has an impact on a 
country’s citizenry. A treaty violation claim will likely not arise until an 
individual is adversely impacted by the treaty’s implementation. An 
individual will not have standing or a purpose to attack the treaty as a 
whole until they have been adversely impacted, at which point 
challenging the overall validity becomes less important than the issue at 
hand the individual actually wishes to challenge. It is clearly 
inconsistent to state that individuals may only challenge the overall 
validity of the treaty. If an individual can challenge a treaty as a whole, 
it does not follow logically that the individual cannot challenge a piece 
of that whole. By opening the door for the validity of a treaty to be 
challenged, the door must be held open to all other inquiries stemming 
from the treaty. 
In numerous cases the Supreme Court seems to be operating under 
the presumption that an individual possesses the requisite standing to 
assert a treaty violation.128 The decision to find that a defendant 
possesses appropriate standing is intertwined with the Court’s finding 
that they lack jurisdiction in cases in which a defendant appears before 
them to claim that a treaty has been violated.129 While the Supreme 
Court appears to be leaning towards a defendant having proper standing, 
case law shows that lower courts are not following suit. It is evidently 
necessary that the Supreme Court clarify what standard should apply in 
treaty violation cases. 
Many scholars also argue that persons should have the right to 
challenge a treaty. The case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain130 is frequently 
discussed by scholars when it comes to individuals claiming violations 
of a treaty.131 In Sosa, the defendant was looking to challenge the basis 
 
 128. Siegal, supra note 80, at 786. See also United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 424, 431 (1886); 
Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64 (1899); Cook v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
 129. Siegal, supra note 80, at 786-89. 
 130. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 692. In Sosa, a Mexican national was kidnapped by DEA agents and 
brought to the United States to stand trial for the murder of a DEA agent. This case did not involve the 
specialty provision. 
 131. See generally Siegal, supra note 80. 
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of his extradition but, under existing case law and treaty jurisprudence, 
he was unable to do so on his own. Fortunately for him, he was able to 
attract the attention of the Mexican government. With the Mexican 
governments backing, the United States was essentially forced to 
dismiss the indictment against Alvarez- Machin. The bizarre set of facts 
in this case is the reason that many scholars use it to argue that an 
individual should be able to challenge a treaty violation. Such facts 
indicate that, in some circumstances, it appears to be a crucial 
international human rights violation to not allow a defendant to 
challenge the treaty and thus his basis for extradition. 
In summation, individuals should be found to possess the standing 
necessary to challenge a violation of a treaty. Allowing this to occur 
should not be absolute and it should be necessary for a claimant to show 
a tie to damage, whether that be physical or monetary, which will be 
discussed in more depth below. Furthermore, it is not appropriate to 
only allow signatory nations to bring actual or potential treaty violation 
claims. A bright-line rule works ineffectively in this type of setting 
because signatory nations may not always have an individual’s best 
interests in mind, especially when potential secondary effects of non-
compliance are taken into consideration.  
B. Individuals Should Possess Standing to Challenge the Violation of a 
Treaty 
A definitive answer that citizens do not possess the power to 
challenge the validity of a treaty is inappropriate. Generally speaking, a 
defendant, or anyone else who is adversely impacted by a treaty, should 
possess the requisite standing to challenge a violation. An individual 
should be able to step into the shoes of the signatory nation to challenge 
overall validity and specific violations, and the signatory nation should 
never be given the opportunity to waive the individual’s rights and 
preclude their objections. 
However, to challenge a treaty, it should be a prerequisite that the 
treaty has a negative implication, whether direct or indirect, physical or 
monetary, on a particular individual, such that the reasonable person 
would find it necessary for that individual to possess the appropriate 
standing to challenge. In such a situation, a defendant will be directly 
impacted by the treaty and have standing to challenge its validity. The 
same may be true if a similar rationale is employed to an individual’s 
family members. Under the latter principle, an applicable example 
would be the family members of an incapacitated defendant. The family 
members would be able to step into his shoes to argue that a violation of 
a treaty has taken place on his behalf.  
16
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While some individuals should be allowed to challenge treaty 
violations, it is not reasonable to say that anyone may challenge a 
violation. Without some sort of personal connection or tie to the actual 
treaty violation,132 it is simply not plausible to allow just anyone to 
challenge any actual or potential treaty violation. To allow this would 
allow for an overflow of violation claims burdening the legal system. In 
allowing individuals who are directly, or at least more closely, impacted 
to bring treaty violation claims, we may still see attorney’s seeking out 
client’s in attempt to find that violation. However, the system would 
likely not be opened to the floodgates by individuals who have not felt 
an impact by the alleged violation.  
A potential issue in allowing individuals to bring treaty violation 
claims, especially when they themselves are directly impacted, is that 
they may see the use of this measure as a way to slow down certain 
processes, which is more relevant in a criminal context. While there is 
potential for this vehicle to become a stalling tactic, this factor alone 
should not place an overall ban on an individual’s right to challenge. 
Cost could be a further barrier in attempt to bar these claims. 
Allowing all claims to proceed would certainly be a costly matter, one 
that can be addressed by implementing a vetting process. This may 
include taking a look into the merits of the case when it is filed or within 
a specified time thereafter to determine whether the facts and argument 
warrant the claim to proceed. An alternative avenue to this may be 
establishing clear guidelines that must be satisfied to even proceed to the 
route discussed in the preceding sentence. While two theories are 
mentioned above, it may prove difficult in practice to impose clear 
guidelines. A case-by-case analysis is likely more appropriate due to the 
broad-range and naturally subjective nature of the claims that would be 
submitted to the court. 
C. A Defendant Should Be Able to Invoke Rules of Specialty  
A criminal defendant should possess the power to invoke the rules of 
specialty if a provision exists in the relevant extradition treaty. While 
opening the door for many defendants to invoke these rules may be time 
consuming and potentially costly, those are insufficient reasons to place 
a blanket ban on their use. If the rules of specialty may be used as a 
stalling tactic in some situations, it is not evident that all extradited 
criminal defendants will challenge intending to achieve this result. 
Allowing a defendant to invoke specialty will result in a greater sense of 
 
 132. Perhaps a personal connection or tie that may suffice in this instance could be anything from 
incarceration to financial hardship or extreme emotional distress. This standard could also be applied to 
close family members of a defendant. 
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equity. Furthermore, simply allowing the rule to be invoked does not 
require the court to grant or approve all requests under these provisions. 
Under current jurisprudence, and contrary to numerous pieces of case 
law, a defendant must have standing before he can make a claim that his 
rights have been violated under an extradition treaty.133 It should, 
although it does not currently, logically flow that a defendant must be 
able to challenge the treaty, in whole or in part, to validly make a claim 
that his rights have been violated. Although extradition treaties are 
essentially contracts between nations, these contracts should not be 
viewed to displace the basic human rights that individuals are afforded. 
By not allowing a defendant to challenge a violation of a treaty that 
adversely affects him, those basic rights are put at risk. 
The freedom to contract is, and has been, a respected part of law in 
the United States. It is important to note that the rule of specialty is a 
contractual provision. The United States has effectively contracted with 
other nations, to govern the relationship between them. Since the 
citizens of the signatory nations have the potential to be adversely 
impacted by the provisions entered into, they should be given the right 
to challenge those provisions when they believe that they are being held 
as a result of something contrary to the treaty’s written terms. By 
disallowing a defendant to challenge his extradition under the existence 
of a specialty provision, the government should not only be subject to 
potential human rights violations, but they also open the door to breach 
of contract issues. In absence of a complaint from the signatory nation, 
the affected person should acquire the rights that the signatory nation 
possesses to challenge the claim. If his rights are per se derivative, he 
should possess the ability to invoke the rule of specialty. To avoid 
greater injustice, a signatory nation should not possess the power to 
waive all claims involving violations. That opportunity should simply 
flow to the affected person. 
D. An Extradited Defendant’s Other Crimes Should be Excluded from 
Sentencing 
It is contrary to public policy and international law to suggest that a 
foreign defendant should be tried for crimes in which he was not 
extradited for. This is consistent with the original stated purpose of the 
specialty provision: to maintain trust between nations who agree to 
extradite individuals. Under a similar rationale, the other crimes, for 
which a defendant was not extradited, should not have a presence in any 
 
 133. While case law suggests that a defendant may challenge the validity of the treaty as a whole, 
it also suggests that a defendant may not challenge individual pieces to that treaty.  
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step of a defendant’s judicial proceedings. 
Only crimes a defendant is extradited for, and actually convicted of, 
should be presented. While special agreements do exist between 
countries to provide a roadmap with the specifics of extradition and 
other matters of foreign policy, any defendant that is brought to the 
United States should be treated as if he is a United States citizen being 
tried in the United States. The policies and procedures should not vary, 
unless specifically authorized or stated in a contract by the countries and 
acknowledged by the defendant.134 Just as a presentence report is often 
prepared by probation officers for daily handlings in the court system, a 
presentence report should also be prepared for a defendant who is 
extradited to the United States.135 The presentence report may contain 
crimes only in which the defendant was convicted of in other 
jurisdictions, and may not contain crimes in which United States 
authorities believe that the defendant committed, but was not convicted 
of, prior to said extradition. 
While the Sixth Circuit was correct in invoking the rules of specialty, 
it was incorrect in allowing even the mere discussion of other crimes 
allegedly-committed by the defendant, regardless of whether or not it 
affected his sentence. If it was deemed so necessary to include 
information of his past crimes, he should have been prosecuted for them, 
or returned to Canada so that a new extradition request could be 
processed through Canadian authorities. Regardless of whether or not 
(1) a foreign individual is put on trial or (2) he or she committed obscure 
crimes, foreign individuals still have basic rights and one of those rights 
should be the exclusion of any mention of crimes that he or she was not 
charged with or convicted of. Without this right, there is, at the very 
least, a remote chance that the defendant will be prejudiced by the 
inclusion or discussion of these crimes.  
The Sixth Circuit’s decision to allow discussion of additional crimes 
was not proper, even though the crimes were deemed to be so related to 
what the defendant was being sentenced for. This, alone, is not an 
appropriate justification for allowing such related crimes to be 
discussed. It is never appropriate for a judge to essentially assume guilt 
for these uncharged, and thus unproven, crimes—something that 
occurred when the judge discussed the crimes that the defendant likely 
committed pre-extradition. The Sixth Circuit allowed the particular 
discussion of the defendant’s crimes to occur because they noted that, 
regardless of the fact that the additional victims were brought up at 
 
 134. If he objects to the change, he must be given an opportunity to be heard.  
 135. Paul Bergman, Your Presentence Report and How to Improve It, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/your-presentence-report-how-improve-it.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2018).  
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sentencing, the defendant was given a lower sentence than the 
recommended life sentence. Essentially, the court based its justification 
on the fact that the information’s admission allegedly had no impact. An 
alternative argument is that if the information had no impact, it should 
not have been allowed in because it wastes the time and resources of all 
parties involved. If the inclusion has no impact, the information is 
irrelevant.  Allowing it to be spoken is arguably only working to make a 
mockery of the defendant in a setting (a sentencing in particular) where 
he is unable to defend himself. Allowing information of alleged, but 
uncharged, crimes into any stage of the judicial process promotes 
injustice and is an infringement on basic rights. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On February 12, 2019, El Chapo was found guilty by a jury on all ten 
counts of a superseding indictment.136 It does not appear that there was 
an issue with El Chapo effectively being charged with crimes not listed 
in the extradition request between the United States and Mexico.137 If 
the prosecution had attempted to tack on additional crimes, without 
following the proper protocol, it is unlikely that the Mexican 
government would have stepped in to claim a violation of the rule of 
specialty.138 If this situation had arisen, the defense could have, and 
should have, argued that the Sixth Circuit’s holding in United States v. 
Fontana controls and that El Chapo should only be tried for the crimes 
upon which his extradition was based. 
 
 136. “El Chapo” verdict: Notorious drug lord convicted in U.S. trial, CBS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/el-chapo-guilty-verdict-today-trial-of-notorious-drug-lord-joaquin-
guzman/. 
 137.  When El Chapo was brought to the United States, the fourth superseding indictment charged 
him in seventeen counts. Another superseding indictment was later issued, charging him in ten counts.  
Ultimately, El Chapo was tried on the ten-count indictment. Press Release, Department of Justice, 
Detention Memo (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/929896/download. 
 138. This assertion is based upon Mexico’s previous embarrassment in its dealings with El Chapo. 
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